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market risks and how to manage them may help people to make decisions 
about their wealth management. Life-  time saving just to ﬁ  nd that only half 
is remaining at the retirement age is painful. The chapter also mentions that 
71 percent of population aged twenty and over have no knowledge about 
investment in equities and bonds and 57 percent have no knowledge about 
ﬁ  nancial products.
Contemporary young Japanese are, in general, not happy with being in 
an aging society. However, the last part of the chapter shows a positive 
impact of elderly on younger generation. People in early retirement (sixty 
to seventy-  ﬁ  ve years old) actually make net intrafamily transfers to other 
age groups (ﬁ  gure 4.13). Their large portions of consumption are from labor 
income and income from assets (ﬁ  gure 4.15).
Why do older people decide to make a transfer to their oﬀspring, knowing 
that pension beneﬁ  ts would fall short of their living expenses from age sixty? 
It could be altruism or intrafamily old age insurance. Once they retire, they 
live in a quiet and lonely environment. Any accident could happen easily 
to an elderly person at home. If they live with their children, those incidents 
will be mitigated. Should they live alone, they have to make some contribu-
tion in exchange of the visits from their children and grandchildren. The 
visits have some cost. Transfers from the elderly, therefore, could be a reward 
for their tender-  loving care to their parents.
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Comment  Alejandro N. Herrin
While providing an interesting account of Japan’s experiences in population 
aging, the chapter also provides insights for analyzing policy issues related 
to economic-  demographic and social changes in developing countries cur-
rently undergoing age structure change of varying timing and speed, and 
at varying stage of socioeconomic development. I focus my comments on 
these insights for developing countries.
Alejandro N. Herrin is a visiting research fellow at the Philippine Institute for Development 
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Eﬀect of Economic, Social and Policy Changes 
on the Age Pattern of Consumption and Production
The chapter describes Japan’s changing age proﬁ  les of per capita con-
sumption and per capita production (ﬁ  gure 4.7) as inﬂ  uenced by a number 
of interacting factors. These factors include patterns of economic growth, 
labor and social security policies, and social change. The last factor involves 
value shifts in family support for the elderly, and preferences for compo-
sition of assets; for example, land versus others forms. While one could 
speculate on what would have happened to the proﬁ  les of Japan’s per capita 
consumption and production over the past twenty years had these factors 
been diﬀerent in timing and speed, of practical interest is the eﬀectiveness 
of recent policy reforms in the areas of, for example, mandatory retirement 
age, public pension schemes, long- term care insurance schemes, and medical 
insurance schemes.
Broadly, the analysis provides insights into possible factors to consider 
in macro-  demographic simulations to test out various scenarios for other 
countries. For example, what would be the proﬁ  le of consumption and pro-
duction in countries characterized by slow and uneven economic growth, 
high poverty rates, slow demographic transition, and limited coverage of 
institutional mechanisms for public transfers? In these countries, high and 
low income groups are likely to have diﬀerent demographic proﬁ  les, capaci-
ties for human and capital formation and patterns of transfers. What is the 
impact on overall poverty and income distribution over the longer term 
for such diverging economic and demographic proﬁ  les among major social 
groups within the country?
The analysis of Japan’s experience provided by the chapter also points to 
some policy insights for developing countries trying to catch up economi-
cally, demographically, and institutionally with the developed world. For 
example, on economic policies, in the face of rapid growth of the absolute 
size of the labor force, would emphasis on achieving full employment ﬁ  rst, 
rather than focusing on labor policies to protect the workers through social 
security and pension schemes (which tend to raise the cost of labor relative 
to capital, and reduce labor absorption), have more far reaching impacts on 
overall patterns of consumption and production and economic growth?
Eﬀect of Age Structure on Economic Growth Given 
Age Patterns of Consumption and Labor Income
The chapter estimates the ﬁ  rst and second demographic dividend in 
Japan. The authors ﬁ  nd that the magnitude of the positive ﬁ  rst demographic 
dividend (annual growth rate of the economic support ratio, which mea-
sures the change in output per eﬀective consumer due solely to changes 
in age structure) was large, adding just over 1 percentage point per year to 
economic growth during the 1960s and 1970s (ﬁ  gure 4.8). However, since Japan’s Unprecedented Aging and Changing Intergenerational Transfers    1 6 5
the mid-  1990s, the economic support ratio has been declining, and the ﬁ  rst 
dividend has become negative.
The estimate of the second demographic dividend (i.e., the growth rate of 
productivity or output per labor income that arises because of an increase in 
the demand for assets as a consequence of population aging) is made over 
the period from 1960 to 2035. In the 1980s, the second demographic divi-
dend generated almost 1.5 percentage points of additional economic growth 
(ﬁ  gure 4.9). Beginning from the 1990s, the second demographic dividend has 
declined to around 0.5 percentage point, with the prospect of maintaining 
this lower rate up to 2035.
Figure 4.16 shows estimates of the ﬁ  rst demographic dividend for selected 
Asian countries. Following Japan’s experience in rapid demographic transi-
tion, South Korea, Thailand, and China added another 1.0 to 1.5 percent-
age points to their economic growth solely due to age structure change. The 
pace of fertility decline was relatively much slower in Indonesia, Philippines, 
and India. As a result, the ﬁ  rst demographic dividend added only less than 
1 percentage point to economic growth. For the latter three countries, and 
similarly situated countries, an immediate goal is how to reap the full beneﬁ  ts 
of the ﬁ  rst demographic dividend both in an accounting sense—through 
a more rapid decline in fertility—and, in a behavioral sense through bet-
ter economic policies and stronger institutions. While age structure change 
through fertility decline can add to economic growth, other factors, such as 
continued rapid total population growth because of slower fertility decline, 
misguided economic policies, and weak institutions, could easily negate the 
contribution of age structure change to economic growth. The resulting 
overall slower economic growth and development would have implications 
for the pattern of consumption and production, asset accumulation, and 
the age reallocations, and, in turn, on the capacity to generate the second 
demographic dividend.
Changing Patterns of Age Reallocations
The third part of the chapter describes the eﬀect of aging on the changing 
pattern of age reallocations for 1984 to 2004. The reallocations are made 
through assets, net public transfers, and net private transfers.
The chapter shows important changes in age reallocations resulting from 
the rapid growth of the elderly population (ﬁ  gure 4.12, panels A to C). In 
general, over this period, net total transfers increased by three times, with 
the increase coming mainly from public transfers, while net familial transfers 
have declined. Furthermore, asset-  based reallocations have become impor-
tant, increasing ten times during the period, although net public transfers 
still dominate in 2004.
How well an aging population can support the consumption of the elderly 
depends on how well the demand for life cycle pension wealth is accumu-
lated. The authors note that for countries which rely on capital accumulation 166        Naohiro Ogawa, Andrew Mason, Amonthep Chawla, and Rikiya Matsukura
to meet the retirement needs of the elderly, population aging would provide 
an incentive to accumulate capital and other assets, and thus usher in the 
second demographic dividend.
Countries lagging behind the demographic transition would nonethe-
less undergo an aging process. But the slow demographic transition carries 
with it lost opportunities for faster economic growth and poverty reduction. 
Moreover, countries with slow demographic transition and limited coverage 
of the institutions for public saving (e.g., social security schemes and social 
health insurance)—such as the Philippines—are likely to also experience 
limited capacity in the future for age reallocations either in the form of 
transfer wealth (public and private) or in the form of asset accumulation to 
support the aging population and reap the second demographic dividend.
Putting Interrelationships Together: Policy Simulation Modeling
The chapter examined three diﬀerent aspects of Japan’s postwar economic-
 demographic experience: (a) the role of economic, social, and policy changes 
on the age pattern of consumption and production, (b) given an average 
age pattern of consumption and production, the eﬀect of age structure on 
economic growth, and (c) depending on the nature of the age reallocations, 
the emergence of the second demographic dividend. For policy simula-
tion, it might be instructive to put economic, social, and policy parameters 
to interact with age structure change that could simultaneously produce 
diﬀerent levels and shapes of the age pattern of consumption and produc-
tion, diﬀerent patterns of the ﬁ  rst demographic dividend, and diﬀerent age 
reallocations. The empirical analysis for Japan described in the chapter pro-
vides building blocks for such policy discussions in developing countries.